Keywords: Second-price auction  Common value  Model uncertainty We analyze a second-price auction with two bidders in which only one of the bidders is informed as to whether the object is valued commonly. We show that any equilibrium strategy of the bidder who is uninformed must be part of an equilibrium when both bidders instead know that the auction is not common value, regardless of the way in which the values are different. We derive sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence.
Introduction
The popular press seems to be intrigued by the uncertainty about the motivations and identities of bidders in auctions and takes particular interest when a high-stakes auction has been won by a "mystery bidder".
1 However, to a dealer who seeks resale profit, the presence of a mystery bidder poses a possible challenge for formulating a bidding strategy. If both the dealer and his opponent compete in the same downstream market, then they might well have the same value for an artwork after revelation of all privately held information. 2 On the other hand, if his opponent is a private collector, their valuations are likely to be much less interdependent. It is therefore natural to ask how a dealer would bid against a mystery bidder who may be either a dealer or a collector. This paper studies an auction that is motivated by such a situation. 3 We consider an auction (the Mixed Game) in which two bidders play one of two games: Game C, a second-price common-value auction, or Game N, a second-price auction ✩ We would like to thank George Deltas and Asher Wolinsky for useful comments and suggestions. The paper has significantly benefited from the help of an anonymous referee and an anonymous advisory editor. We also thank participants where values are not common. One bidder (Bidder 2) knows which game is being played (she is model-informed), but the other (Bidder 1) does not (he is model-uninformed). In Game N, we allow for an arbitrary relationship between valuationsthis includes the possibility of private values as well as intermediate dependence (i.e., "interdependent values"). We restrict attention to equilibria in bid functions that satisfy a certain smoothness property. Given this restriction, we show that, in any equilibrium of the Mixed Game, the bid functions used in Game N constitute equilibrium strategies in Game N. This follows from a peculiar feature of second-price common-value auctions (see Milgrom, 1981) : essentially any strategy for Bidder 1, paired with Bidder 2's best response to it, constitutes an equilibrium of Game C. Now, consider any equilibrium of the Mixed Game. By virtue of Bidder 2's best response and the above property of common-value auctions, Bidder 1's strategy must be a best response in Game C. The key step is to show that Bidder 1 must also be playing a best response in Game N. Suppose he does not. Then a small deviation towards the Game N best response would yield him a first-order gain in Game N. It would yield him only a second-order loss in Game C, since the putative equilibrium strategy constitutes a best response in Game C. He would therefore want to deviate.
We thus conclude that the bidders coordinate with reference to the non-common-values equilibrium. Using this property, we derive sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence.
Our paper relates to several papers that have investigated the sensitivity of equilibria to small differences in values or small amounts of private information in otherwise common-value environments. Notable examples include Bikhchandani (1988) , Bulow et al. (1999) , Klemperer (1998), and Larson (2009) . 4 Bikhchandani's paper is the closest to our work. He analyzes a particular case of our model whereby, in Game N, the model-informed Bidder 2 has a higher valuation than her opponent with certainty. He shows, among other things, that Bidder 2 wins with certainty in case Game N occurs.
Model
Consider a second-price auction with two bidders. 5 There are two possible states of the world: C and N. It is common knowledge that state C occurs with probability θ and that state N occurs with probability 1 − θ . In state C, Bidder 1 (he)
and Bidder 2 (she) have a common value for the object. In state N, they may not. A strategy for Bidder 2 in the Mixed Game is a pair of bid functions (β 2C , β 2N ) that map signals to bids in each state. A strategy for Bidder 1 is simply β 1 , as he does not observe the state. We consider interim Bayesian Nash equilibria and restrict attention to undominated strategies of the Mixed Game -that is, equilibria in which none of the strategies are weakly dominated. We also restrict attention to strictly increasing bid functions that are continuous and that are continuously differentiable at all but finitely many points. 6 Define the bid intervals
. Each bid function can be represented equivalently by its inverse -σ 1 , σ 2C and σ 2N respectively.
Characterization of equilibrium
A well-known condition for equilibrium, when applied to the Mixed Game, requires that Bidder 1 bid his value conditional on tying with his opponent, whenever ties are possible. This value depends on two dimensions of his opponent's information -her signal and the state. If Bidder 2 bids p ∈ B 2C \B 2N , then Bidder 1 must infer state C. If she bids p ∈ B 2N \B 2C , he must infer state N. When p ∈ B 2C ∩ B 2N , his inference must be derived according to Bayes' Law.
Let D be the set of points p ∈ B 2C ∩ B 2N at which both σ 2C and σ 2N are continuously differentiable. When Bidder 1 has signal s 1 and observes Bidder 2 bid p ∈ D, the probability he assigns to state C iŝ
. 4 In a similar spirit, Parreiras (2006) shows that a small probability that a second-price auction is in fact a first-price auction eliminates the multiplicity of equilibria associated with second-price common-value auctions. 5 Because there are only two bidders, the English button auction and the Vickrey auction are strategically equivalent. 6 We briefly discuss the possibility of equilibria in discontinuous bid functions at the end of Section 4. 
Bidder 1's updating rule is thus defined for Bidder 2's bids in the set
We can now state our central result.
is an equilibrium in undominated strategies in the Mixed Game for any probability of state C, then (β 1 , β 2N ) is an equilibrium (possibly in dominated strategies) of Game N.
Proof approach. Suppose that (β 1 , (β 2C , β 2N )) is an equilibrium in the Mixed Game. Since β 2N must be a best response to β 1 , we need only verify that β 1 is a best response to β 2N . Lemma 1 gives necessary conditions for β 1 to be a best response to (β 2C , β 2N ) in the Mixed Game. Lemma 2 gives a necessary condition for β 2C to be a best response to β 1 . Together, these imply certain conditions (given in Lemma 3) that imply β 1 is a Game N best response to β 2N (as shown in Lemma 4). 2 Lemma 1. For any θ ∈ (0, 1), Bidder 1 is best responding to Bidder 2 only if
Proof. Conditions (ii) and (iii) simply state that Bidder 1 does not want to deviate downwards when s 1 = 0, nor upwards when s 1 = 1. Condition (i) states that, at any bid p in the range of possible bids for both bidders, Bidder 1 is bidding his expected value conditional on receiving signal σ 1 (p) and tying with Bidder 2, provided the expectation is well-defined. This requirement follows from standard arguments (see, e.g., Milgrom, 1981 
Again the proof is standard, and hence omitted. (β 2C , β 2N ) ) is an equilibrium in undominated strategies in the Mixed Game, then
Proof. For Bidder 2's strategy to be undominated in the Mixed Game requires that, for any s 2 ) . Clearly, then, the first integral in Lemma 1(ii) is non-positive and the first integral in Lemma 1(iii) is non-negative.
Conditions (ii) and (iii) of this lemma follow. The unprofitability of deviationb = β 1 (0) implies that the above inequality holds for integration over the set {s 2 : β 1 (0) β 2N (s 2 ) < β 1 (s 1 )}. Therefore, it is enough to show it holds when integration is over only {s 2 :
v 1N is increasing in s 1 , it is enough to show that
This is immediate from Lemma 3(ii) when the bidders' signals are independent. Otherwise, an argument using the MLRP is needed, and this is given in Appendix A. 2
Consider now the Mixed Game with some fixed probability of state C, θ ∈ (0, 1). It is interesting to ask whether an equilibrium (β 1 , (β 2C , β 2N )) of the Mixed Game for the probability θ must also be an equilibrium for other values of this probability. Since (β 1 , β 2N ) is an equilibrium in Game N, it is easy to show that the equilibrium persists for probabilities lower than θ . However, for higher probabilities (including probability 1 -i.e., in Game C), this need not be the case. Suppose that there exist signals s 2 such that Bidder 2 wins with certainty in state C, and that for such signals β 2C (s 2 ) < v(1, s 2 ). Although Bidder 1, when receiving signal s 1 = 1, would not wish to deviate for low probabilities of state C (because it would be detrimental in case state N occurs), he may well wish to deviate upwards for high probabilities. To ensure this is not the case, we might impose a further restriction on Bidder 2's possible strategies in the Mixed Game.
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RS(C): Bidder 2's strategy satisfies
The next result then follows from the arguments above. Game C and (β 1 , β 2N ) is an equilibrium in Game N.
Proposition 2. Suppose the strategy pair (β 1 , (β 2C , β 2N )) is undominated in the Mixed Game and β 2C satisfies RS(C). It is an equilibrium in the Mixed Game if and only if (β 1 , β 2C ) is an equilibrium in
Existence of equilibrium
Suppose we confine our interest to equilibria satisfying RS(C). Then, by Proposition 2, the question of existence may be answered by considering whether there are functions β 1 , β 2C and β 2N such that (β 1 , β 2C ) is an equilibrium of Game C and (β 1 , β 2N ) is an equilibrium of Game N. We give conditions for equilibrium existence in Proposition 3 below.
We find it convenient to consider equilibrium bid functions β 1 and β 2N that satisfy analogues of the condition RS(C).
RS(N):
Bidder 2's strategy satisfies β 2N (s 2 ) = v 2N (1, s 2 ) whenever β 2N (s 2 ) > β 1 (1) and β 2N (s 2 ) = v 2N (0, s 2 ) whenever β 2N (s 2 ) < β 1 (0).
RS(1): Bidder
1's strategy satisfies β 1 (s 1 ) = v 1N (s 1 , 1) whenever β 1 (s 1 ) > β 2N (1) and β 1 (s 1 ) = v 1N (s 1 , 0) whenever β 1 (s 1 ) < β 2N (0).
Proposition 3. There exists an equilibrium of the Mixed Game in undominated strategies that satisfies RS(1), RS(C) and RS(N) if, for
Condition (i) is the "single-crossing condition" suggested initially by Maskin (1992) . It guarantees existence of an equilibrium in Game N. Condition (ii) says that Bidder 1's signal has a greater marginal effect on his value when the state is N than on the common value. Condition (iii) is more difficult to interpret, but is implied by conditions (i) and (ii) together with the requirement that, for all
Proof of Proposition 3. Given condition (i), arguments similar to Lemma 2 of Krishna (2003) imply that an equilibrium in undominated strategies exists in Game N, with bid functions satisfying RS(1) and RS(N). Suppose that (β 1 , β 2N ) is such an equilibrium. We construct a best response β 2C to β 1 that satisfies RS(C). It follows immediately that β 1 is a best response to β 2C in state C, establishing that (β 1 , (β 2C , β 2N )) is an equilibrium. The construction of Bidder 2's best response β 2C proceeds in three steps.
Step 1 shows that β 1 is "sufficiently steep"
to admit a continuous and increasing best response by Bidder 2 in state C.
Step 2 defines the interval over which ties can occur in state C, and
Step 3 constructs β 2C as the solution to a differential equation. Verifying that β 2C is a best response is left to the reader.
Step 1. In this step, we show that, for any p ∈ B 1 and any s 2C ∈ [0, 1], and provided that σ 1 is differentiable at p,
To see this, note that, if either p < β 2N (0) so that (by RS(1)) σ 1 solves
then the result follows by condition (ii). If p ∈ B 2N , it is ensured by condition (iii). This is because the equilibrium require-
which, after differentiating with respect to p and solving for dσ 1 (p) dp , yields
Step 2. If v(1, 0) > β 1 (1) or v(0, 1) < β 1 (0) then Bidder 2's strategy can be specified according to RS(C), with Bidder 2 either winning or losing with certainty for all signals. So suppose that v(1, 0) β 1 (1) and
, and since β 1 is continuous, we may specify p such that
We will construct a best response for Bidder 2 for which ties are possible for bids in [p,p] .
Step 3. On the interval [p,p] , bids must be determined by
An increasing and continuous function σ 2C that satisfies this equation can be constructed on [p,p] as a solution to
(wherever the derivative of σ 1 exists), with initial condition given by σ Proposition 3 provides sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence that are fairly easy to check. A natural case to consider is when state N is pure private values. In this case, condition (i) is automatically satisfied and conditions (ii) and (iii) are equivalent. So an equilibrium exists provided that condition (ii) is satisfied.
The conditions of Proposition 3 are, however, somewhat more restrictive than necessary for the existence of the equilibria that we consider: i.e., those in undominated strategies, with bid functions that are increasing, that satisfy the continuity and differentiability conditions given in the model set-up, and that satisfy RS(1), RS(C) and RS(N). There are two reasons for this. Condition (i) is more than required for equilibrium in Game N (although, this assumption has been made routinely in the literature on efficiency of second-price auctions). Also, the requirement that conditions (i)-(iii) hold for all possible signal realizations is more than required. Of course, this restriction does not matter if values are linear in the signals (since the derivatives in conditions (i)-(iii) are then independent of bidder signals).
Although the conditions are not necessary for the existence of the equilibria that we focus on, the following example illustrates why, when condition (ii) fails, there may be no equilibrium in undominated strategies with continuous and strictly increasing bid functions. Whilst Example 1 suggests why the conditions of Proposition 3 are important for equilibria in the class we consider to exist, note that other equilibria, especially those in discontinuous bid functions, may be possible. For instance, consider Example 1 and suppose that signals are uniformly distributed. Then, there exists an equilibrium in undominated strategies with discontinuous bid functions satisfying RS(1), RS(C) and RS(N). Indeed, the bid functions β 1 (s 1 ) = a + ns 1 , β 2N (s 2 ) = a + ns 2 , and
constitute such an equilibrium.
10 Furthermore, (β 1 , β 2N ) constitutes an equilibrium of Game N. It is therefore possible that, even when there is no equilibrium in continuous bid functions and undominated strategies, the conclusion of Proposition 1 remains valid. Another example of interest is the model proposed by Deltas and Engelbrecht-Wiggans (2005) , where Bidder 2 may be "naïve" in the sense that she misunderstands the importance of the winner's curse and fails to take into account the information revealed by Bidder 1's bid. Note that β 1 is the same bid function Bidder 1 uses in the case when it is commonly known that Bidder 2 is naïve.
Concluding remarks
This paper has considered an auction in which one bidder is uncertain as to the correct model of valuations, namely whether values are common. Our central result is that, in this situation, bidders coordinate on the non-common-values equilibrium. The result is relevant to situations in which the motivation of one of the bidders at an auction is uncertain. An example is where the identity of a bidder is uncertain (i.e., when there is a "mystery bidder"). Our result holds in an environment that accommodates both a general form of interdependent values in case values are not common, as well as correlation of bidder signals (subject to the MLRP).
Our finding that the non-common-values equilibrium is focal would not carry over to general situations in which both bidders face uncertainty about the commonality of values.
12 Nor would it apply directly to a second-price auction with more than two bidders, only some of whom know whether values are common. Nonetheless, the two-bidder end game of an English auction with such bidders might take exactly the form analyzed here. The first inequality follows because, by construction, {γ ∈ Γ } = N(b), whereas {m(γ ): γ ∈ Γ } ⊂ P (b) (whilst ψ is negative on N(b) and positive on P (b)). The second inequality follows by ( * ).
